FrontPage

Nation

World

Media

Culture

Technology

Commentary

For Cheney and Powell, it’s Déjà Vu All Over Again

TruthNews Commentary, February 21, 2001

As Secretary of State Colin Powell attempts to reinvigorate the sanctions against Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, it may be instructive to recall why Hussein was allowed to remain in power after America’s overwhelming victory in the Gulf War ten years ago. As America and our allies prepared to go to war in February of 1991, then-President George Bush established two primary goals for the war: the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait and the destruction of Hussein's power.

After a punishing air campaign that destroyed much of the Iraqi army’s combat power, the plan for the Allied ground attack called for the Marines and other Allied forces to attack the occupying Iraqi forces in Kuwait while the Army executed a strategic envelopment from the west toward Basra in southern Iraq. The purpose of this maneuver was to trap the Republican Guard, Hussein’s elite troops, before they could escape across the Euphrates. The plan unraveled, however, when the Marine attack drove the Iraqis out of their defenses rather than fixing them in place. In addition, the Army enveloping attack into southern Iraq took several days to complete, and many of the Iraqi troops were able to escape entrapment. However, by February 28, the Army units were in position to prevent the escape of many Republican Guard units.

On February 28, General Colin Powell, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, advised President Bush to stop the attack. His primary reason for suddenly terminating the war was because of news reports describing air attacks on retreating Iraqis along the so-called highway of death. In addition, Powell and then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney thought it would be nice to end the ground war after 100 hours.

Apparently, neither Powell nor Cheney were aware that the destruction of the Republican Guard had not yet been accomplished. Thus, the order to halt the ground war was disastrously premature, driven not by military considerations but public relations concerns. If either Powell or Cheney had consulted the field commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, he could have told them that the Republican Guard had not been destroyed. Instead, Powell telephoned Schwarzkopf to tell him of a decision that he and Cheney had already made. Thus, Cheney and Powell stumbled into the same faulty decision making process that spelled failure in the Vietnam war, namely, Washington bureaucrats making tactical decisions without having sufficient facts in hand to hand.

Following the ceasefire, Hussein was able to use the Republican Guard units that had escaped to destroy the Kurdish and Shiite rebellions, maintain his power, and reconstitute his missile and nuclear programs. Continued sanctions have hurt the Iraqi people but have done little to drive Hussein from power. Now, many of the Arab countries as well as European “allies” such as France have called for an end to sanctions. Given this deterioration of the U.S. position in the Gulf since the war, the failure of Powell and Cheney to assess the tactical situation before calling an end to the war ranks as a failure of major proportions.

With Cheney now wielding major influence over U.S. foreign policy as Vice President and Powell installed as the Secretary of Defense, it will be interesting to see how they will rectify their past mistakes. Will they develop a coherent strategy for containing Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction, or will they continue to shoot from the hip as they did during the Gulf War? The next few months should reveal the answer.